This paper presents a model of technology invention in an emerging market. Managers wait and adopt the standard technology in the hope to free-ride on the e®ort level of another manager who may invent a superior technology. The more managers who adopt the standard technology, the more their successors believe that probably the superior technology doesn't exist. As this hampers the successors' incentives to innovate, herding in my model reduces the scope of strategic waiting.
Introduction
People often infer information out of the actions of other people. For example, when making their purchasing decisions consumers often choose the most popular brand because they think that its popularity indicates a better price/quality combination 1 . People do not go and eat in an empty restaurant, because they believe that the food quality is low. When arguing with someone, try to strengthen your argumentation by claiming that everybody agrees with you on that point. This trick (even if it is not true) often succeeds in convincing more reluctant minds that you are right.
This tendency to base decisions largely on the observed decisions of other agents has recently been modelled as information externalities. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) (henceforth BHW) made the¯rst models which stressed the ine±ciencies of these information externalities in a context of social learning 2 . Both models consider a population of individuals each endowed with a private, costless and imperfect signal concerning the desirability of a course of action. People decide sequentially whether to adopt or reject a given course of action. People observe which actions were taken by the persons who moved before them, but they do not observe their signals. If enough individuals have adopted the same behaviour, then each subsequent individual neglects her private signal and herds on the actions of the¯rst persons, because the informativeness of their combined actions is higher than the informativeness of any one signal. More interestingly they also showed that herding is quite likely to cause a "bad outcome", i.e. an outcome where all (or the vast majority of all) players adopt an action which ex post turns out to be suboptimal.
Subsequently a number of other papers appeared which also stressed the ine±-ciencies entailed by information externalities in di®erent contexts of social learning. For example 3 Chamley and Gale (1994) consider a set-up similar to BHW except that all players have the possibility to wait in order to observe how many 1 Caminal and Vives (1996) analyse a game where¯rms engage in price competition in order to become more popular and bene¯t from these information externalities.
2 With a "context of social learning" we mean a context where one person must choose an action out of a prespeci¯ed action set and which has, prior to her decision, the opportunity to learn out of the choices made by her predecessors.
3 The models we brie°y discuss in this paragraph are among the most famous ones, but the list is certainly not exhaustive.
players invest in the current period and to make their investment decision in the next period based on superior information. They showed how in their context bad outcomes and ine±cient waiting may occur in equilibrium. Avery and Zemsky (1998) also consider a set-up similar to BHW except that they add a competitive market maker in the picture which sets the price of an investment asset on the basis of all available information. They show that due to herding short-run price bubbles can occur provided that traders are uncertain about the precision of the other traders' signals. Vives (1993) shows that in the presence of a continuous action space in the long run bad outcomes do not arise, i.e. eventually everyone will adopt the right action. However in the presence of noise (when observing the actions of the other players) the rate of convergence towards the right action is slow.
To summarise, so far the literature on social learning mainly stressed di®erent inefciencies (short-run price bubbles, bad outcomes, ine±cient waiting, slow learning, ...) entailed by information externalities. All these ine±ciencies are due to the fact that players when choosing their actions rely too little on their private information and too much on the public one. In this paper we argue that herding 4 also possesses some positive aspects in the sense that players may have less incentives to wait in a herding environment.
We study the following set-up. We assume that a¯xed number of¯rms enter sequentially in an emerging market. Each¯rm is run by one manager who maximises his utility. Upon entrance in the market managers must choose a technology. Managers can choose to adopt an "old" technology. Adopting this "old" technology is easy: it doesn't require e®ort from the manager. Managers can also choose to exert a high e®ort to check the existence of a new (and more pro¯table) technology. With a probability p a new technology exists, which will always be found if e®ort is provided. We assume that -due to switching costs -it's only pro¯table to innovate upon entrance in the market. After the adoption of the old technology it's only pro¯table for a¯rm to imitate the new technology if it is invented by a subsequent manager. Managers act strategically in the sense that they all may wait, adopt the "old" technology in the hope to free-ride on the e®ort of another manager inventing a better technology.
We¯rst compute the (unique) equilibrium of our game if everyone observes the e®ort levels and the technological choices of all their predecessors. In these circumstances there are no informational asymmetries and thus also no herding. In this benchmark case all¯rst movers wait and free-ride on the e®ort level of the last manager. This benchmark case is thus characterised by a lot of free-riding 5 and, as switching from the old to the new technology is ine±cient, note that in our model free-riding is ine±cient. This free-riding is driven by our assumption that the new technology is a public good. Once a manager invented the new technology, by assumption it can be copied by all the other managers in the economy at no cost. As inventing the new technology constitutes a costly activity all managers in our model have a natural incentive to wait in order to free-ride on someone else's e®ort level.
Next we assume that all managers only observe one another's technological choices (and not one another's e®ort levels). We show how herding attenuates the freeriding problems present in our benchmark case. The intuition goes as follows. Late movers observe the early movers adopting the old technology. As they infer the inexistence of the new technology out of their actions, this induces them to adopt the old technology as well (in other words late movers tend to herd on the actions of the early movers). Early movers realise that they have little possibilities to freeride on the e®ort level of late movers and this induces them to exert e®ort. This paper thus highlights the existence of a trade-o® between herding and waiting (or free-riding).
We also show that late entrants (who put a lower probability on the existence of the new technology as compared to the one put by early entrants) may exert a higher ex ante e®ort level than early entrants. This is because in equilibrium the probability with which the second up to the last manager exert e®ort is determined by the interplay of two e®ects. The¯rst e®ect, which we call the herd e®ect, states that the more managers who adopt the old technology, the higher the probability that a previous manager unsuccessfully checked the existence of a superior technology, the lower a manager's incentives to exert e®ort. As mentioned in our 5 And with free-riding we mean that a manager takes an ine±cient action (i.e. adopts the standard technology) in the hope to free-ride on the e®ort of another manager. Free-riding and waiting are thus equivalent in our model and henceforth we will almost always denote this behaviour by waiting. previous paragraph, this e®ect explains why with unobservable e®ort levels our players have less incentives to wait. The second e®ect which we call the free-rider e®ect states that late entrants know that they cannot rely too much on the e®ort of a subsequent manager inventing a better technology. This e®ect ensures that late entrants still face a lot of incentives to exert e®ort. We show that -depending on the values of our exogenous parameters -the free-rider e®ect may dominate the herd e®ect. In that case late entrants exert a higher ex ante e®ort level than early ones.
In the following paragraphs we discuss more in depth how this paper relates to other models in the literature of social learning. We discuss the other papers in increasing order of relatedness.
Smith and S¿rensen (1997) study a set-up similar to the one of BHW (i.e. without analysing issues of strategic waiting) in which they consider a social planner who maximises the present value of all agents' utilities. In their paper a socially more e±cient outcome is obtained when some players internalise their information externality. They show that players can be induced to internalise their information externalities by means of a simple set of history-contingent balanced-budget transfers. In our paper information externalities are internalised because all players know that -due to herding -they will be less able to free-ride on the e®ort levels of subsequent movers. Rob (1991) models dynamic entry in an emerging market. Potential entrants observe the actions (quantity choices) and the payo®s (pro¯ts) of the incumbent¯rms and out of this infer information concerning the realisation of an unknown demand parameter. Due to an information externality the rate of entry in the emerging market is lower than the socially optimal one. His model does not possess our main insight that herding may act as an incentive device because in his model the act of waiting does not entail any negative information externality. In his model an information externality only occurs whenever a¯rm enters in the emerging market. If a¯rm decides to wait (to gather information from the entry decisions of the other¯rms) this does not in°uence the remaining players' posteriors concerning the pro¯tability of the market (and thus doesn't hamper their incentives to enter the emerging market at a later date).
In Chamley and Gale (1994) some players receive an option which gives them the right to invest. The higher the realised state of the world, the higher the probability that each player receives an investment option and the higher the return from the investment project. All players who possess an investment option have the possibility to wait, to observe how many other players invested in the previous period and to make an investment decision on the basis of more information. They prove the existence of a unique equilibrium where all players who possess an investment option invest with a symmetric probability¸such that the informational gain of waiting is o®set by the opportunity cost of waiting.
Herding does not reduce the scope of strategic waiting in their model. If in their model all players would truthfully exchange their signals, then¯rst best applies i.e. everyone would take the correct ex ante investment decision in period one. Why is it that in our model herding reduces the scope of strategic waiting and not in theirs? Which crucial assumptions explain this di®erence? In our model we assume (i) the existence of aggregate uncertainty (in Chamley and Gale's model if the number of players becomes large there is no (or almost no) aggregate uncertainty) and (ii) that the good state of the world becomes publicly known as soon as one player exerts e®ort. To see that it are really these two assumptions which make the crucial di®erence, take Chamley and Gale's model but assume that (i) the economy is populated by a limited number of players who possess an imperfect signal and (ii) the return of the investment project becomes publicly known as soon as one player invests 6 . If players were to share truthfully their signals then they would all possess the same posteriors. In this context -due to aggregate uncertainty (due to the limited number of players) -everyone still has an incentive to wait until someone else invests (and thereby resolving the aggregate uncertainty). Assume now that our players do not exchange their signals (due for instance to the absence of a certi¯cation technology). In that case if an optimist 7 waits, other players partly infer a bad signal out of this. As this hampers their future incentives to invest, optimists have then less incentives to wait.
In Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) two oil¯rms possess a private imperfect signal concerning the pro¯tability of drilling an exploratory oil well. If one¯rm drills, then the other¯rm costlessly observes whether there is oil or not and (in case of success) makes a riskless investment decision in the next period. Both¯rms wait in the hope to free-ride on the drilling cost of the other¯rm. If one¯rm delays its drilling decision, this "signals" to the other¯rm that it possesses a poor signal. The subsequent downward revision of its prior may induce the other¯rm to let its lease expire without drilling any well (which is nothing else than the herd e®ect we mentioned earlier). Herding does not act as an incentive scheme in their model because they only work with a two-period model. In their model both¯rms don't care about each other's second-period posteriors because (by construction) they cannot free-ride on each other's second-period drilling decision. This paper thus shows that additional insights can be obtained when generalising their model to N periods. This paper is organised as follows. In section two we explain the basic assumptions of our model. We¯rst analyse the workings of our model under the assumption of observable e®ort levels and observable technological choices (section 3). In section 4 we work under the assumption that players do not observe one another's e®ort levels. First we illustrate how herding acts as an incentive device by focusing on a simple equilibrium where only one manager exerts e®ort. Next (section 4.2) we analyse the case where N managers exert e®ort (with a certain probability) in equilibrium. Final comments are summarised in section 5.
The Model
We consider a simple model of dynamic entry in an emerging market. Our model counts two phases: a¯rst one called the adoption phase and a second one called the production phase. Throughout the paper time is discrete. In the adoption phase we assume that in each di®erent period t = 1; :::; K (K¸2 (K 2 IN)) one (and only one)¯rm enters in a market and makes her technological choice. Each¯rm is run by a risk neutral manager/entrepreneur who maximises an expected utility function. Henceforth we call manager t, the manager who enters in the emerging market at time t. Next, (after period K) in the production phase all managers receive their payo®s by producing and selling their goods in a¯nite market (which lasts from period K + 1 until period K (K¸K + 1 (K 2 IN ))).
Manager t must use a technology (chosen out of the set T t 2 fo; ng) from his time of entry until time K 8 . In the beginning of the¯rst period T 1 = fog. o represents an "old" technology. One can best think of o as a technology which is widely used in other industries, everyone knows how o works and everyone knows its pro¯tability characteristics. Assume that T t = fog. Manager t, before adopting his technology, has then two options: he can either adopt o at no cost (i.e. without exerting e®ort) or he can exert e®ort e to try to invent a new, more pro¯table technology denoted by n. If manager t successfully invents n, then 8t 0¸t , T t 0 becomes equal to fng which implies that manager t (along with all his successors) has no other option left than to adopt the new technology. Moreover we assume that once n was invented, all previous managers instantaneously exchange their old technology for the new one and stick to it until the end of the game 9 . If manager t doesn't invent n, then T t remains equal to fog and in the beginning of period t + 1, T t+1 = fog. It is assumed that the new technology exists with a probability p 2 (0; 1) and will always be invented if it exists and if a manager exerts e®ort e. We assume that if manager t invents n, all previous and subsequent managers bene¯t from a knowledge spillover e®ect in the sense that they adopt n without incurring the cost of e®ort (however previous managers who switch from o to n incur a switching cost (see below)). The use of n (o) during the production phase generates a total pro¯t of ¼(¢) (¼). The "height" of ¼(¢) depends on whether or not a manager had adopted o prior to his adoption of n. Formally, ¼(¢) is determined by the function ¼ : I1 ¡! IR where I1 = fs; nsg represents an indicator function which takes the value s (ns), whenever a manager switched from o to n (adopted n from scratch).
We model the managers' utilities as a v.N.M. utility function. Suppose T t = fog. If manager t decides to exert e®ort at time t his expected payo® equals E(U je; ns) = p:U (¼(ns)) + (1 ¡ p):U (¼) ¡ e (e > 0). To hold matters simple, we assume that U (¼) = 0 and that U(¼(ns)) = 1, so E(U je; ns) = p¡ e. If an entrant exerts e®ort, with probability p there exists a new technology which he will¯nd (for sure) and in the production phase this will give him a payo® equal to 1 ¡ e. However our diligent manager may be unlucky because with probability (1 ¡ p) there does not exist a new technology. In that case our manager must use o to operate in the This assumption could best be defended by allowing all¯rms to produce and sell their goods from their time of entry on. However, this would imply that a manager's payo® would depend on his time of entry, an unnecessary complication.
emerging market. In the production phase he will then get a payo® equal to ¡e. We also assume that -due to switching costs -U(¼(s)) =°< 1. In order to highlight the interesting features of our model, we suppose that:
Under assumption one all our (risk neutral) managers have an individual incentive to exert e®ort at their time of entry. We also assume that all managers rather imitate instead of innovate. This is captured by our following assumption: A2: p ¡ e < p°A ssumption A2 states that given°, manager one rather waits (and never exerts e®ort) and free-rides on the e®ort of the second manager, if he believes the second manager will exert e®ort for sure. So A2 naturally introduces strategic waiting in our model. If a manager who did not exert e®ort and adopted o in a previous period decides to exert e®ort at time t, he gets E(U je; s) = p°¡e. We assume that: A3: p°< e Assumption 3 is an important simplifying assumption. It ensures that in equilibrium managers only want to innovate at their time of entry. The main di®erence between our exogenous queue assumption and the one present in Banerjee (1992) and BHW (1992) is that in our model all managers still care about their successors' actions. The precise repercussions of A3 will be discussed more in detail in the next sections. 0) At time zero: nature decides whether n exists or not. 1) At time t: manager t enters in the market and observes T t and the past e®ort levels of all his predecessors. In case T t = fog, manager t chooses his e®ort level. If he invents n, T t becomes equal to n, the new technology is immediately adopted by manager t and copied by all his predecessors and subsequent followers. 2) Period K + 1 until period K: managers receive their payo®s and the game ends.
We assumed that the new technology will always be invented if it exists and if a manager exerts e®ort e. The inexistence of n is thus proven as soon as a manager exerts e®ort and adopts o. Hence a manager only wants to exert e®ort (i) at his time of entry, (ii) if none of his predecessors adopted n and (iii) if none of his predecessors exerted e®ort. Therefore we de¯ne a strategy for manager t, q t , as a probability with which manager t exerts e®ort at his time of entry if none of his predecessors exerted e®ort. A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a (q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q K ) such that no manager has an incentive to deviate given the other managers' strategies. In this case we obtain the following result:
proposition 1 Under A1, A2 and A3, with observable technological choices and observable e®ort levels, the unique SPE of our game is: q 1 = q 2 = ::: = q K¡1 = 0, q K = 1.
Proof: Consider¯rst the optimal decision of manager K. Manager K observes that all his predecessors use the standard technology. But he also observes that none of his predecessors exerted a high e®ort level. Therefore manager K knows that if he exerts a high e®ort level with prior probability p he will¯nd the superior technology. Under A1, manager K wants to exert e®ort. As mentioned previously, under A3 none of the K-1¯rst movers want to exert e®ort at time K. Therefore q 1 = q 2 = ::: = q K¡1 = 0, q K = 1 constitutes an equilibrium strategy. Under A2 the¯rst K ¡ 1 movers rather wait and free-ride on manager K's e®ort level. Therefore q 1 = q 2 = ::: = q K¡1 = 0, q K = 1 constitutes the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Note that proposition (1) crucially rests on A3. This can easily be illustrated with an example where K = 2. If p°¸e, q 1 = 1, q 2 = 0 also constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium. To see this, suppose that manager one exerts no e®ort and adopts o. Call q 12 the probability with which manager one exerts e®ort at time two. In the second period there are two¯rms in the market with two managers who both have an incentive to exert e®ort. This subgame possesses three Nash equilibria: q 12 = 1, q 2 = 0; q 12 = 0, q 2 = 1 and there also exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which q 12 = p¡e p°a nd q 2 = p°¡e p°.
If manager one at time one anticipates that if he were to exert no e®ort, in period two they would either play the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium or the equilibrium q 12 = 1, q 2 = 0, then manager one rather exerts e®ort in period one. Therefore, if p°¸e (q 1 = 1, q 2 = 0) constitutes a SPE. The reader can easily generalise this insight to the case with K managers, if p°¸e there are K di®erent equilibria with each time a di®erent manager who exerts e®ort.
Proposition (1) shows that if all players have a lot of information at their disposal, this will result in a lot of waiting. This result bears some close resemblance to the one that was derived earlier by Rob(1991) . Rob also models dynamic entry in an emerging market under the assumption that all players observe all the incumbents' payo®s and actions. As mentioned in the introduction in his model due to an information externality the rate of entry is lower than the socially optimal one (in other words the equilibrium (just as in our model) is characterised by too much waiting). In the remainder of the paper we will introduce herding in the model (i.e. managers who "blindly" imitate the technological choices of their predecessors in the hope that they exerted e®ort) by allowing for informational asymmetries. We will see that in a herding environment our players have much less incentives to wait.
In this paper it's natural to take the case without any private information as our benchmark one because of its sharp contrast with our non-benchmark case. Two remarks. First, note that if in Banerjee (1992) or BHW (1992) all players would observe one another's signals and actions, all players would ex ante take the most e±cient action and¯rst best would apply. So the choice of our benchmark case makes it explicitly clear that herding only reduces the scope of strategic waiting when in the absence of any private information, players would still have an incentive to delay their (informative) actions. Second we could have chosen the case where all players don't observe actions (i.e. technological choices) nor e®ort levels during the adoption phase as our benchmark one. We expect that giving all players the possibility to observe one another's technological choices during the adoption phase, this should increase welfare and e±ciency (compared to the case where all players don't observe anything in the adoption phase) because late movers would then have the possibility to free-ride on the e®ort level of an early mover. However, this result is not original nor surprising. Already in Banerjee (1992) and BHW (1992) late movers are better o® (in an ex ante sense) when they observe their predecessors actions (as compared to the case where they don't observe anything) because they may act with more information than their predecessors.
4 A waiting game with observable technological choices and unobservable e®ort levels.
In this section we consider the same game as the one we analysed in our previous section except that now our players only observe one another's technological choices and not one another's e®ort levels. A manager is called active if in equilibrium he exerts e®ort with a strictly positive probability. In this case we de¯ne a strategy for manager t, q t , as a probability with which manager t exerts e®ort at his time of entry if none of his predecessors adopted n (in all the other cases a manager strictly prefers not to exert e®ort). As e®ort levels are unobservable this is a dynamic game of imperfect information. Each manager -upon observing his predecessors adopting the old technology -must have a belief concerning which node in the game tree was reached. If a manager believes that at least one of his predecessors exerted e®ort, then he rather adopts the old technology without exerting e®ort. In this model beliefs concerning past e®ort levels matter because they ultimately in°uence p t = P rob[n existsjt ¡1¯rst managers use o], which in its turn in°uences manager t's incentives to exert e®ort. Therefore we de¯ne our equilibrium concept using each manager's posterior (concerning the existence of the new technology) instead of working directly with his beliefs concerning past e®ort levels. P = (p; p 2 ; :::; p K ), Q = (q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q K ) and Q ¡t = (q 1 ; q 2 ; :::; q t¡1 ; q t+1 ; :::; q K ). A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a (Q; P ) such that: (i) given p t and Q ¡t , manager t cannot gain by deviating 8t, and (ii) given Q, p t is computed via Bayes' law, 8t.
We now analyse equilibrium strategies in our game. We¯rst focus on an equilibrium with one active manager which already shows how in this model herding acts as an incentive device. Next we generalise our results to N (1 < N · K) active managers.
An equilibrium with one active manager.
Our main result with one active manager is summarised below:
proposition 2 Under A1 and A2, there exists a SPE in which only the¯rst manager is active and where q 1 = 1.
Proof: Suppose all managers revise their priors under the assumption that q 1 = 1, q 2 = q 3 = ::: = q K = 0. It is then quite easy to see that under this assumption it's optimal for manager one to exert e®ort with probability one. Suppose manager one deviates exerts no e®ort and adopts o. Manager two at his time of entry observes that manager one adopted o. His expected gain of exerting e®ort equals: P (n existsj man. 1 uses o)¡e = p 2 ¡ e, where:
Manager two computes p 2 by replacing q 1 in (1) by 1. Therefore p 2 = 0. This is logical: manager two is sure that manager one exerted e®ort. Therefore he interprets manager one's act of adopting o as a "proof" that n does not exist. Since p 2 = 0 < e, q 2 = 0. Manager three observes that the¯rst two managers adopted o. Using Bayes' law he computes his posterior p 3 = P(n exists j¯rst two man. use o):
in which he substitutes q 1 by one and q 2 by zero. Hence p 3 = 0 < e and consequently q 3 = 0. All subsequent movers compute the same posterior (p 4 = p 5 = ::: = p K = 0) and therefore it's optimal for them not to exert any e®ort (q 4 = q 5 = ::: = q K = 0). Manager one knows this. Correctly anticipating that q 2 = q 3 = ::: = q K = 0, manager one knows that he is the only one for whom it is pro¯table to exert e®ort. Hence it is optimal for him to exert e®ort with probability one.
Of course this is not the unique equilibrium with one active manager. For example there also exists a SPE in which only the second manger is active and where q 2 = 1 (under A2 it is indeed optimal for manager one to set q 1 = 0 and to free-ride on the e®ort level of the second manager). As a matter of fact with only one active manager there exist K equilibria with each time a di®erent manager who exerts e®ort for sure, but none of them entail more waiting than the (unique) equilibrium we obtained when e®ort levels were observable. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, the strategy in which only the¯rst manager exerts e®ort for sure constitutes a SPE because manager one -knowing that if he adopts o, subsequent movers will revise downward their prior probabilities and will never exert e®ort -internalises his information externality by exerting e®ort. Therefore in equilibrium one obtains less waiting. Note also that proposition (2) does not rely at all on A3, even if°were equal to one, the strategies described in the proposition would still constitute a SPE.
4.2 An equilibrium with N (1 < N · K) active managers.
An existence and uniqueness theorem.
With N managers, all managers compute their equilibrium probabilities out of the following set of N + (N ¡ 1) nonlinear simultaneous equations. The¯rst N equations merely state that our N managers must choose their e®ort levels such that everyone, given their posteriors, is indi®erent between the two pure strategies:
. .
The remaining (N ¡ 1) equations determine the posteriors of manager two to manager N (since p 1 = p, the "posterior" of the¯rst manager is exogenously given and need not be endogenously computed). These equations can be summarized as:
We can now state our most interesting¯nding:
proposition 3 Under A1, A2 and if°· Maxf e p ; 1 ¡ eg, for every set of managers, there exists a unique SPE where they are all active.
Proof: see appendix one and two Our game thus clearly exhibits multiple equilibria in the sense that di®erent sets of active managers lead to di®erent SPE.
11 This multiplicity does not bother us in the sense that no equilibrium of our game with non-observable e®ort levels entails more waiting than the unique equilibrium we obtained with observable e®ort levels.
Before explaining the intuition behind proposition (3) more in detail, we¯rst illustrate it with a simple example with two active managers
An illustration with two active managers.
Assume it are the¯rst two managers who must be active. Both managers compute their equilibrium probabilities out of the equations:
where p 2 is determined by equation (1). Out of (3), we see that q 2 = p¡e p°2 (0; 1). Out of (1), one can easily see that q 1 = p¡e p(1¡e) 2 (0; 1). Note that q 2 is a decreasing function of°. This is logical: manager one is only indi®erent between innovation and imitation if every increase in the switching cost (decrease in°) is compensated by an increase in q 2 . If°is low enough (lower than 1 ¡ e) this implies that manager two in equilibrium exerts a higher (ex ante) e®ort level (which is quite counterintuitive given that p 2 < p). To prove that q 1 = p¡e p(1¡e)
, q 2 = p¡e p°, q 3 = q 4 = ::: = q K = 0 constitutes a SPE we still must check that no manager (not even the¯rst two managers) has an incentive to exert e®ort after observing manager two adopting o.
First assume that p°· e. Under this assumption the¯rst two managers don't want to exert e®ort from date three on. Manager three computes his posterior using (2) in which he substitutes q 1 and q 2 by their equilibrium values. As q 2 > 0, p 3 < p 2 = e. Hence q 3 = 0. As previously, p 4 = p 5 = ::: = p K = p 3 and q 4 = q 5 = ::: = q K = 0. So the third up to the last manager always adopt the same technology as the one which was adopted by manager two. The¯rst two managers -even though they both prefer to imitate instead of innovate -correctly anticipate that they won't be able to free-ride on the e®ort levels of subsequent movers. Therefore they are indi®erent between the two pure strategies and they may as well choose to exert e®ort with a strictly positive probability. Hence, if p°· e, there exists a unique SPE in which only the¯rst two managers are active.
However, even if p°> e, there may still exist a SPE in which only the¯rst two managers are active and exert e®ort with probabilities q 1 = p¡e p(1¡e) and q 2 = p¡e p°.
To see this suppose that e p <°· 1 ¡ e. We know that if°· 1 ¡ e, q 2¸q1 . Suppose both managers don't exert e®ort and adopt the standard technology. Consider both managers in the third period. What induces them to exert e®ort (given that they know their own e®ort levels)? Nothing! Manager one observed that the second manager adopted the standard technology. In the third period manager one computes his posterior
. Now p 13 · e (and thus p 13°< e. This is logical: manager one's posterior (at time three) is not higher than the one of manager two (who was already indi®erent) because q 2¸q1 . Hence manager one, upon observing manager two adopting the standard technology has no incentive anymore to exert e®ort. Manager two doesn't want to exert e®ort in any subsequent period either because p 2 = e. Hence if°· 1 ¡ e both managers know that they won't be able to free-ride on the e®ort level of a manager (including their own e®ort level) after the second period. Given that they are indi®erent, they may as well choose to exert e®ort with a strictly positive probability.
Note that the third up to the last manager never exert e®ort and adopt the same technology as the one which was adopted by the¯rst two managers. Note that this herd may be misdirected because with a probability (1 ¡ q 1 )(1 ¡ q 2 )p all¯rms in the emerging market end up using the old technology when a new one exists, but which was not invented by a diligent manager. This explanation of how an industry can get "stuck" with a suboptimal technology was already o®ered by Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) . J. Zwiebel (1995) explains this observation on the basis of reputational concerns.
Herd e®ect versus free-rider e®ect.
In these paragraphs we provide an answer to questions like: what is the intuition behind proposition (3) and which "forces" in°uence the equilibrium e®ort level of each active manager?
Before answering these questions we¯rst introduce some new notations. z t denotes the probability with which manager t will not exert e®ort (i.e. z t = 1 ¡ q t ). j 2 IN and j = 2; :::; N. Z j+1 denotes the probability that no manager moving after manager j will search for the new technology (i.e. 8j = 2; :::; N ¡ 1, Z j+1 = z j+1 :z j+2 :::z N and if j = N, Z N +1 = 1). Furthermore we de¯ne NE j¡1 as p=p j . In other words NE j¡1 denotes the negative externality induced by the actions of the j ¡ 1¯rst managers on manager j's posterior. NE j¡1 > 1 8j and NE j¡1 is strictly increasing in j. We de¯ne Roe (return on e®ort) as p=e.
All active managers must be indi®erent between the two pure strategies, i.e. p j¡1 ¡ e = (1 ¡ Z j )p j¡1°. We can rewrite this last equation as:
(where C = (1 ¡ 1°) and NE 2¡2 = NE 0 = 1) Equation (4) shows that q j is a function of two opposing e®ects (or "forces").
The¯rst e®ect, which we call the herd e®ect, is captured by the term NE j¡2 . NE j¡2 is increasing in j and q j is decreasing in NE j¡2 : the more one advances in the queue, the higher the sum of the expected e®orts spent by all previous managers, the lower the posterior of manager j ¡ 1, the lower the probability with which manager j must exert a high e®ort to make manager j ¡1 indi®erent (ceteris paribus). This herd e®ect is similar to the one present in the other herding models (Banerjee (1992) , BHW(1992) , Chamley and Gale (1994) , Vives (1993) , Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) , Scharfstein and Stein (1990), ...) . However in this model, due to the herd e®ect, all N managers realise that they won't be able to free-ride too much on the e®ort levels of their successors. Proposition (3) then shows that by appropriately choosing all e®ort probabilities one can make all N managers indi®erent between the two pure strategies and thus willing to randomise. Therefore our model highlights a trade-o® between herding versus waiting which went unnoticed in the current herding literature. The fundamental reason why this insight is not present in Rob (1991) , Chamley and Gale (1994) and Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) was already explained in the introduction.
In our model the herd e®ect also gives birth to a countervailing force which we call the free-rider e®ect. This free-rider e®ect is captured by the term Z j+1 . Z j+1 is increasing in j, and q j is increasing in Z j+1 . This is also logical: the more one advances in the queue, the lower the probability that manager j ¡ 1 can hope to free-ride on the e®ort of a subsequent manager (due to the herd e®ect), the higher the probability with which manager j should exert a high e®ort to make manager j ¡ 1 indi®erent. This free-rider e®ect thus ensures that late movers may still face a lot of incentives to exert e®ort.
Equation (4) also shows that manager j's equilibrium behaviour can be summarised by the following rule: "manager j takes p j¡1 and Z j+1 as given and chooses q j such that manager j ¡ 1 is indi®erent between the two pure strategies".
12 This simple rule also provides a partial intuition why, once we¯x the set of active managers, there exists a unique vector of equilibrium probabilities. Z j+1 is¯xed such that manager j is indi®erent. Since q j¡1 > 0 (otherwise manager j ¡ 1 is not active), p j¡1 > p j . Therefore if q j = 0, manager j ¡ 1 rather exerts e®ort, if q j = 1, manager j ¡ 1 rather waits. By continuity, there exists a unique q j such that manager j ¡ 1 is indi®erent.
One¯nal word of explanation concerning our assumption A3. As explained above, proposition (3) does not fully rely on A3: for high enough a 1 ¡ e, that proposition remains valid even with "low" or "moderate" switching costs. However, the main insight of this paper is that a herding environment may be less prone to problems of strategic waiting than a non-herding one. This was shown by comparing proposition (3) to proposition (1). As proposition (1) crucially rests on A3, our main insight crucially hinges on this assumption. Nonetheless we believe our main insight to be robust in the sense that we can specify two other realistic contexts in which our main insight remains valid and would not depend on A3. First, we can work in a context where°= 1, where the queue is endogenous and where all players face a discount factor ± < 1. Second, in the introduction we already mentioned that our main insight can be recovered without the use of A3 in Chamley and Gale's model provided that we allow for (i) aggregate uncertainty and (ii) the state of the world which becomes publicly known as soon as one player invests.
12 The intuition behind manager one's behaviour is more complicated and is not explained in this paper. Somewhat surprisingly it turns out that manager one chooses q 1 such that manager N is indi®erent. The intuition why manager one is able to make the last manager indi®erent was explained in a previous version of this paper titled "Corporate Conservatism as Endogenous Pessimism" and can be obtained by simple request from the author. For a mathematical explanation see proposition (6) in appendix one.
The temporal pro¯le of equilibrium e®ort probabilities.
In this subsection we check when the free-rider e®ect dominates the herd e®ect (i.e. when late movers exert a higher ex ante e®ort level than early movers).
proposition 4 In equilibrium: q 1 · q 2 · ::: · q N if and only if°· 1 ¡ e, and q 1 > q 2 > ::: > q N if and only if°> 1 ¡ e Proof: From appendix one we know that we can rewrite our system of N + (N ¡ 1) simultaneous equations into a simpler set of N equations in N unknowns:
Assume that°· 1 ¡ e. Then the¯rst terms on the LHS of the equations form a decreasing sequence (· 2¸·2 z 1¸: ::¸· 2 z 1 :::z N¡1 ), so the second terms on the LHS must form an increasing sequence: z 2 z 3 :::z N · z 1 z 3 z 4 :::z N · z 1 z 2 z 4 z 5 :::z N · ::: · z 1 :::z N¡1 . Simplifying these inequalities we get: z 1¸z2 , z 2¸z3 , ... , z N¡1¸zN implying that q 1 · q 2 · ::: · q N which is our result. The proof for°> 1 ¡ e is similar except that the¯rst term of the LHS now forms a strictly increasing sequence and therefore: q 1 > q 2 > ::: > q N .Q.E.D.
The intuition behind proposition (4) was already set forth in an earlier part of this paper. With two active managers we saw that if°is relatively low, manager one was only indi®erent between the two pure strategies if the high switching cost was compensated by a higher q 2 . For low enough a°, q 1 < q 2 . Proposition (4) shows that this result can be generalised to the case with N active manager.
We believe proposition (4) to be an interesting one because it proves a quite counterintuitive result that late movers (who put a lower probability on the existence of n than early movers) may -depending on the values of the parameters -exert higher ex ante e®ort levels than early movers.
Conclusions
This paper analysed a waiting game with information externalities. We di®ered from other papers which introduced information externalities in waiting games (see in particular Chamley and Gale (1994) and Gul and Lundholm (1995) ) in two important aspects. First we assumed the existence of aggregate uncertainty and second, we assumed that the good state of the world becomes (publicly) known as soon as one manager exerts e®ort. In the absence of informational asymmetries the equilibrium exhibits a lot of strategic waiting because all players wait until the last manager exerts e®ort and resolves the aggregate uncertainty. With unobservable e®ort levels all managers (except the¯rst one) revise downward their priors because they infer out of the conservative behaviour of their predecessors the unavailability of the new technology. As all players (except the¯rst one) revise downward their prior probabilities, this hampers their incentives to innovate. Early movers correctly anticipate that if they adopt the old technology, they will be less able to free-ride on the e®ort levels of one of their successors and this induces them to exert e®ort. Therefore this paper shows that in the presence of aggregate uncertainty and if the good state of the world becomes publicly known as soon as one player invests, there exists a trade-o® between herding and waiting which has not been stressed before by other models which introduced informational externalities in waiting games (see a.o. Rob (1991) , Chamley and Gale (1994) , Gul and Lundholm (1995) , Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) , ...). Finally, we also showed that if switching costs are relatively high late movers exert a higher ex ante e®ort level than early movers. We believe this last result to be counterintuitive in the sense that early movers put a higher probability on the existence of the new technology as compared to the one put by late movers. This paper analysed strategic waiting under the assumption that managers only want to innovate at their time of entry. One may want to relax that assumption and work instead with an endogenous-queue model. We believe this constitutes an interesting topic for future research.
As we mentioned in our introduction, the context in our paper is most realistic if one considers the oil exploration industry. Our framework can also be applied to the timing of compatibility decisions between two technologies: a¯rm selling technology A may be induced to search for a technology which would make technology A and B mutually compatible because by not searching she may discourage the other¯rm from doing so. In our opinion, our theory may be applied to other economic¯elds as well. For instance the hold-up problem (or more generally problems due to moral hazard in teams) may become less severe in a herding environment because individuals realise that if they don't work enough this may reveal some bad information and this will discourage others from working hard too. In that case our theory can also be applied to the¯eld of (complete and incomplete) contract theory. Similarly, organisations may structure themselves such as to introduce information externalities in their organisations which may induce some people to work. We believe all this to constitute an avenue for future research. Note that the system of equations starting from (8) to (and including) (9) merely represent a rewriting of the system of equations starting from (6) to (and including) (7). Note also that equation (5) does not intervene in our de¯niton of our candidate equilibrium. Therefore, every equilibrium is a candidate-equilibrium (to see this, replace (5) by z 2 z 3 :::z N = a = · 1 ¡· 2°a nd insert it in all the subsequent equations). However, every candidate equilibrium constitutes an equilibrium only if: (a) all the z t 6 = 1, (b) z 2 z 3 :::z N = · 1 ¡· 2°O ur next proposition shows that once we know z 1 , we are able to compute all the remaining z 0 j s (j = 2; :::; N ).
proposition 6 8 ® 2 (0; 1], there exists one and only one candidate equilibrium such that z 1 = ®.
